A Ridge too far: The story of the 63rd Tennessee

          Dwight David Eisenhower once said that battle plans go up smoke as soon as armies collide. Things go haywire just about the time plans are supposed to go into effect, Ike figured.

          That idea has never been truer than during the Civil War battle of Chickamauga. Case in point: The story of Archibald Gracie’s attack against Horseshoe Ridge, specifically the fate of the 63^rd Infantry Regiment of Tennessee.

This image looks to the front of the 63rd Tennessee's march
toward the Snodgrass cornfield. Horseshoe Ridge is roughly
 a 90 degree angle to the left and the Union artillery ahead
is masked by the rise in the land ahead.

          Basically, the 63^rd was at the far right end of Gracie’s brigade as it attacked the heights of the Ridge in the late afternoon of September 20, 1863. The uneven ground of the uphill approach toward the Union army’s defensive position came into play because Gracie’s straight line of attack through a forested area had to bend where the Ridge curved. Imagine running a group of people toward the corner of a building. Some of those people have to move toward the right side of the corner, some to the left.

          While most of Gracie’s line followed the intended path of attack toward the Ridge’s Hill 1, the 63^rd did not veer to its left and instead kept going straight. The Tennesseans marched into the teeth of a Federal artillery nest situated in a cornfield owned by the Snodgrass family. The 63rd suffered grievously before pulling back a short time later.

This image looks toward Horseshoe Ridge, to the left of the
63rd as it marched. The stone in the upper center is the position
marker for the 63rd after its abuse by the artillery in the
 cornfield. A regimental monument for a Union command
can be seen through trees in the extreme upper left.

          Walking the path Gracie’s command walked on the battlefield this week, your loyal blogger suddenly understood what might have led the 63^rd into trouble. Combat rookies, like most of Gracie’s men, the men of the 63^rd were confronted by ridgelines to both their left and their front. They were initially taking fire from their left and when they topped a small rise in the land, they were also taking artillery fire to their front.

          Before they walked into a new career as cannon fodder, the commanders of the 63^rd must have believed they were attacking their intended position.

          Picture the situation: Combat is terribly noisy, with the cracks of rifles, whizzing sounds of bullets going by (if they don’t hit you), the cries of the wounded and the dark pounding of the big field guns.

This particular piece of war had the added element of small fires burning on the forest floor and the hillsides and tree branches falling from above. At the very least, the smoke from these small fires made recognition of the direction the Confederates were walking harder than it would normally be and the falling branches (shot down one way or another) must have been a terrible distraction.

Just walking was very difficult for Gracie’s men. They had to step over the prone forms of dead and wounded comrades who were members of earlier attacks up the hills. Gracie’s attackers probably singed their feet on the previously-mentioned fires, tripped over discarded weapons, tree roots and, since some of these attackers were without shoes, it probably hurt their feet to strike the hidden hurdles.

It is worth noting a second time that these men had not been under fire before. The hellish confusion that is combat does not allow for timeouts. Adjustments must be made on the fly and that is why Ike, the World War II hero, said that plans don’t matter much once the shooting starts.

Soon after stumbling in to the carnage from the cannons, the men of the 63^rd pulled back to a less dangerous position and here the confusing topography helped them. They pulled back enough that a small fold in the earth’s surface was between them and the Federal field guns, allowing some protection. If they were still within reach of the Union rifles to their left, they were at least safer than they had been and that must have seemed good enough.

The position marker for the 63rd, looking toward the Snodgrass
cornfield. Notice the rise in the round, which may have offered
cover for the beleaguered Tennessee soldiers.

          The 63^rd Tennessee started the day with 402 soldiers and officers and lost more than half its men, counting the killed and wounded. The regiment’s losses were due to the rude greeting in front of the Snodgrass cornfield.

          Had the 63^rd executed the turn to the left that other portions of Gracie’s force completed, it might have lost the same number attacking the determined northern defenders anyway. Their planned position in Gracie’s line approaching the top of the Ridge would have made the 63^rd an excellent target for the artillerymen in the cornfield. As it was, the big guns pounded Gracie’s right flank as it attacked the hillside.

          History has largely skipped past the 63^rd in telling the story of Horseshoe Ridge. It says here that if historians would stand where I stood this week, where the 63^rd walked that bloody afternoon so long ago, history might better serve the Tennesseans.

          Thanks for reading.