Even today, a century and half -- plus
a day -- after the Battle of Chickamauga, there are questions about what
happened over the course of those three days.
For one thing, most historians refer
to the Battle as a two-day engagement. At the risk of being labeled a
revisionist, the last thing your loyal blogger ever wants to hear thrown his
way, the armies involved came into contact in the area of the battlefield on
the 18th of September, 1863. The battle ended on September 20, 1863.
That’s three days. The heavyweight
killing occurred on the 19th and 20th, but the shooting
started on the 18th and so it is termed here a three-day fight.
Then there is the question asking why
the Confederates failed to press their advantage the morning of September 21st.
Why did they not try to chase the Union soldiers out of the important city of
Chattanooga?
They should have, no doubt, had they
been able. But Confederate commander Braxton Bragg did not order his men to
attack Chattanooga on the 21st. The Confederate Army of Tennessee was shot to
pieces during the previous three days. Most Confederate units, especially at
the regiment and company levels, had lost officers.
Command and control, the procedural
processes that run an army, were terrible weaknesses under Bragg before his army suffered the stunning
losses at Chickamauga. With so many officers dead or too badly injured to be
useful, the Confederates would have struggled to mount anything beyond a
demonstration at Chattanooga in front of the equally shot up Federals.
Bragg had regiments which were not
badly hurt during the battle, but he probably did not know it the night of
September 20/21. On top of that, even the regiments not badly shot up were
exhausted, thirsty and hungry. Most of Bragg’s regiments were out of ammunition
or nearly so at the end of the fighting on the 20th.
Finally, the Confederates did not know
the Union army had run as far as Chattanooga until a cavalry unit reported as
much the next morning. For all the Confederates knew on the night of September
20/21, the Army of the Cumberland would attack the Confederates when the sun
came up on the 21st.
Bragg’s Confederates were somewhat
like George Meade’s Federals on July 4, the day after the end of the Battle of
Gettysburg: Capable of an attack, perhaps. Ready to attack? No.
One of the key controversies of Chickamauga
is over what happened between the commander of the Confederate right wing, Lieutenant
General Leonidas Polk, and Major General D.H. Hill, a commander serving under
Polk.
Bragg’s plan for the 20th
was for Polk’s right wing to attack at dawn. Hill’s forces were to lead the
attack. Longstreet’s left wing would attack when it heard Polk’s forces engage
the enemy.
But the right wing did not attack
because Polk did not make certain his subordinate, Hill, was informed of the
plan. Neither Polk nor Hill liked serving under Bragg and twice within a period
of 10 days the two acted like petulant children, refusing to follow orders.
Bragg deserves his share of blame. At
such an important time as the night of Sept. 19/20 at Chickamauga, Bragg should
have given his senior commanders their orders all together in order to iron out
any questions. Bragg did not do that.
One problem Bragg faced was the
arrival of Longstreet and his force of about 12,000 on loan from Robert E.
Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. Bragg did not know when Longstreet might
arrive, although he knew Longstreet would be at the battlefield that night.
And
that brings us to another key question: Why did Bragg decide to change the
shape of his command structure in the midst of a major battle? Why did he decide
to place Longstreet in command of the Confederate left wing before Longstreet
even arrived?
It’s
a good question. Here’s another: What else could Bragg do with Longstreet?
Obviously, Longstreet had to be in command of something and the commanders Bragg had on hand before Longstreet
arrived were not following orders.
Maybe
Bragg just wanted someone who might follow orders on the left side. If so, he
chose well. Longstreet, who arrived about midnight and accepted wing command
without having seen the ground he was supposed to attack in the morning,
managed to have his wing ready to attack when the time came.
The
right side wasn’t ready and the Confederate attack was delayed for hours.
Bragg’s
decision about the command of his left wing was unconventional, given the
situation. But an unconventional decision can still be the right one.
Then,
of course, there is a real mind-bending question: Should the battle have taken
place at all?
Rosecrans
already had the biggest prize in that part of Tennessee, the city of
Chattanooga. Some students of the battle would argue that the battle never
should have happened, that Rosecrans should have been satisfied with the
capture of Chattanooga and should not have been chasing after Bragg at that
point in time.
But
students who argue that side of the question forget that Rosecrans’ commander
in chief, Abraham Lincoln, had long told his army commanders that the job of
the Union army was the destruction of the Confederate armies, not the capture
of areas or cities.
Thus,
Rosecrans was following orders when he chased after Bragg. Following orders is
an excellent idea, especially when the orders come from the President of the
United States.
Chickamauga
is a battle known for ferocity. It is known for its controversies. But it should
also be known for its famous – in some cases infamous – roster of combatants.
On
the Federal side, General George Thomas, who earned his nickname The Rock of Chickamauga on Horseshoe
Ridge, and General Phillip Sheridan were there. Longstreet and General John
Bell Hood were on the Confederate side, as was the 15th Alabama
Infantry Regiment, the same group that gained fame for attacking, and failing,
at Little Round Top during the fight at Gettysburg. The commander of the 15th,
William Oates, was later elected Governor of Alabama.
Nathan
Bedford Forrest, a Confederate cavalry commander who later became an early leader
of the Ku Klux Klan, served at Chickamauga.
Federal
General John M. Palmer and Confederate General Simon Buckner joined together as
the Democrat Party’s nominees for president and vice president in 1896. Palmer
served as Governor of Illinois and Buckner was elected Governor of Kentucky
prior to that presidential effort.
Rosecrans
moved to California after the war and became a US Senator. James Negley,
another Federal general, was also elected to Congress after the war.
Rest assured that
your loyal blogger is not running for Congress. Still, he thanks you for
reading.
