The news that this year’s Civil War Institute at Gettysburg
College would be conducted virtually was a cause for celebration here. Your
Loyal Blogger was worried that the CWI would not be held at all. The Institute
is an annual, five-day gathering of the top Civil War scholars and about four
hundred others who love to study and talk about the topic. It’s a crash course
with lots of company and the company is the big thing. The CWI, for all of its
scholarship and debates, is about the people. The ‘people’ includes fellow
attendees, the scholars and, especially, the cast and crew who host the thing
every year. The College is a wonderful host and the perfect location for such
an event as the CWI.
Once the CWI ends, I get to begin my own research. I’ve
been stumbling around for several years now, trying to figure out the truth
about a incident during the battle of Gettysburg. I love exploring
Gettysburg and any chance to roam the battlefield is a welcomed opportunity. I usually
bring with me a list of questions I want to explore and one question has been
on my list for several years now.
The question is what route did Captain Samuel R. Johnston
take when he was ordered to recon the left side of the federal line on Cemetery
Ridge at about four in the morning on July 2, 1863?
 |
| I do not believe Johnston got to the top of LRT. There were no signs to direct him. |
The eminent historian Noah Andre Trudeau wrote a brilliant
volume: The Battle of Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage. In that book
Trudeau says Johnston reached the Sherfy peach orchard before turning south and
heading for the Round Tops.[1] I have not found any quote
from Johnston where he specifically claims to have reached the Sherfy peach
orchard. But say for the moment that he did get there.
Many students of the battle scoff at the idea that Johnston
reached the peach orchard without being discovered by union scouts or pickets.
I am tempted to give Johnston the benefit of the doubt in that it is possible
that Johnston and the men with him approached the Sherfy peach orchard.
Remember that Daniel Sickles had not yet advanced his line. It was still mostly
dark at the time Johnston went on his ride. It is possible that he
reached the area of the Sherfy peach orchard during the outbound leg of his
recon without getting caught.
Most of the Union soldiers in the area at that time were
not bedded down on the Emmitsburg Road or anywhere near it. They were much
closer to the Taneytown Road. The rolling topography and darkness would have
made it impossible for Johnston to see conditions along the Taneytown Road from
the locations he wrote that he reached. Johnston could have neared the
Sherfy land that morning without any union videttes discovering the group.
The Bushman Farm. Little Round Top in the
background a mile away.
Johnston reported that the only union soldiers he saw were
in a four-man party that was riding north along the Emmitsburg Road. Those men
were seen as Johnston and his men cautiously waited before crossing the road on
the way to report to Lee.
In a June 27, 1892 letter to McLaws, Johnston wrote, “It
was about 4 AM when I started out, my general route was about the same that
General Longstreet took when he made his march. I crossed the creek on the same
bridge that he did and turned left at once and turned to the left at once and
got on the ridge where you subsequently (got a view of the enemy) … following
that ridge in the direction of the round top across the Emmettburg (SIC) Road
and got up of the slopes of round top, where I had a commanding view, then
(unclear handwritten note) road along the base of round top beyond the ground
that was occupied by General Hood, and where there was later a cavalry fight.
When I thought I had gone far enough, I turned back, of course moving with
great caution, and when I again got in sight of the Emmettburg Road I saw three
or four troopers moving slowly and very cautiously in the direction of
Gettysburg (north, LE). … I recrossed the bridge and took the most direct route
regardless of fences to where I had left General Lee.”[2]
 |
| From LRT, looking west and a little north. Note Seminary Ridge in the distance and the area Johnston would have had to cover in the open had he approached the Sherfy property. I believe Johnston came toward LRT from a position further south along Seminary Ridge. |
The route Longstreet’s column took later that day did not travel to the Sherfy peach orchard. When Longstreet reached Seminary Ridge and deployed his men, he could see the Sherfy peach orchard in the distance. By that time, Dan Sickles had advanced his division to his position in the Sherfy peach orchard. It should be noted here that even if Johnston did ride to the Sherfy property on his recon ride, he could not have seen Sickles’ force. Sickles did not advance until long after full daylight.
The bridge Johnston wrote about twice is probably the bridge
on today’s Millerstown Road near where the road intersects today’s West
Confederate Avenue, not far from the modern-day Eisenhower Tower.
I
believe Johnston and his party turned right shortly after crossing that bridge
and headed in a southerly direction. They continued south after passing by the
Bushman farm before eventually turning left and heading in an easterly
direction. The route would take them toward the Round Tops. Approaching from
the Confederate side of the hill, that is to say from the west, they would have
been less likely to encounter Federal soldiers. This was in the area where
General John B. Hood’s men would later begin their attack. Hood was wounded on
a dirt lane that led from the Bushman farm to the Slyder farm and it is very
possible that Johnston followed the same little lane toward the Round Tops.
In
a June 28, 1875 letter to James Longstreet, Hood wrote that, “… about twenty
minutes after reaching the peach orchard I was severely wounded in the arm, and
borne from the field.”[3]
 |
| I believe Hood was wounded on this road. The Slyder Farm is in the distance. The Bushman property to to photographer's right. |
Johnston wrote of having a “commanding view” while on “round top.” The hill we now call Big Round Top had more trees on its north-west-facing slopes than did what we call Little Round Top. The most commanding view from either hill is what we call the face of Little Round Top. If Johnston did not ride up the side of Little Round Top, he certainly recognized the potential for watching the battlefield from there.[4]
At
the point of the recon where the Johnston group was at the Round Tops, the sun
was starting to make itself known.[5] Johnston and his men had
to leave the area. He describes skirting the base of “round top” and then his
desire to get back on the friendly side of (correctly) Emmitsburg Road. Then
came the forced delay while the four riders went slowly down the road. Later, when
Lee asked Johnston directly whether he reached the Little Round Top/Big Round
Top area, Johnston answered that he had done so. I believe that he did.
The
description of crossing the bridge that Johnston said Longstreet’s march later
crossed is an important note. Longstreet’s march should have crossed that same
little bridge as his men moved to get into position to begin their attack as
they marched on Millerstown Road that day.
To
ride south on Emmitsburg Road from the Sherfy property that night probably
would have meant Johnston being discovered by Union troops. But riding south
along Warfield Ridge, passing the Bushman farm and its orchard, would have
meant staying within the safe confines of Confederate lines. It would lead to
the safer side of Big Round Top and give him a familiar path back to his own
lines.
I
believe that’s the path he took. Johnston did not leave a record of the recon
ride that was written near the time of the battle. The letters I have read are
type-written translations of his hand-written letters in answer to various
letters asking about his ride that night. Since that time, the version of
events sets forth in those letters have gone under great scrutiny. Johnston’s
words were written thirty years or so after the war.
Can
I prove my assertion? No, but the evidence leads me there. Others, including
Trudeau, might disagree. But I believe my summation of events fits the known
facts – that Johnston was ordered to make a recon, he did so without getting
caught and he reported to Lee that he reached the Round Tops – and agrees with
what Johnston wrote himself.
One
final point. When Gerry Prokopovich was nice enough to interview me about my
Chickamauga book for his podcast, he asked me why it mattered whether we knew
the exact series of events during the fighting on Horseshoe Ridge. It was a
great question and the same question could be answered here. Does it really
matter what path Johnston’s recon party took at Gettysburg around dawn on July
2, 1863? Yes, it does matter. It matters because historic accuracy matters.
[1]
Trudeau, Noah Andre, Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage, page XX. Of all the
books the author has read about Gettysburg, this book stands out for its
excellence. Great read.
[2]
Samuel R. Johnston letter to XX McLaws. The author found a type-written
translation of the letter in the Gettysburg National Military Park Visitors
Center archives.
[3] John
B. Hood letter to James Longstreet, June 28, 1875. The author found a
type-written translation of the letter in the Gettysburg National Military Park
Visitors Center archives.
[4]
Samuel R. Johnston letter to McLaws. The author found a type-written
translation of the letter in the Gettysburg National Military Park Visitors
Center archives.
[5]
Johnston’s ride began around four in the morning. He reported to Lee about three
hours later. Sunrise on July 2 is typically ten to fifteen minutes before six
in the morning at Gettysburg.
